Since the end of World War II, the United States has made maintaining a favorable balance of power in Eurasia a core element of its national security strategy. It did so in good measure by maintaining a large conventional military force that was based not only at home, but also in bases spread across Europe and Asia. That strategy was buttressed by developing security ties and alliances with key powers and front-line states. The implicit bargain was that the United States would help keep the peace on their door front if they would provide access from which American forces could operate and, in turn, maintain credible forces themselves to reinforce and support U.S. efforts at keeping the great power peace. The question raised by this collection of essays is: Is that bargain unraveling? As the following chapters note, since the end of the great power threat posed by the Soviet Union, both the United States and its principal allies have seen fit to cut the size of their forces substantially and, in most cases, slowed efforts at re- placing military systems and platforms. The quandary many of America's allies have faced is, on the one hand, reforming their militaries to make them more expeditionary and useful for addressing various security problems-such as piracy, terrorism, and the instability brought about by collapsing regimes. On the other hand, not having the political resources at home to prioritize defense spending in the face of domestic demands and, more recently, faltering economies are also problems that need to be considered. The result is smaller, half-modernized militaries with often significant gaps in key capabilities. The strategic problem is that, while its allies and partners have shrunk their militaries, so too has the United States. It no longer retains a military sized to handle multiple major contingencies at once as it once did and is now facing the prospect of not only continuing to deal with large-scale disorder within the Middle East but also the problematic behavior of two major military powers, China and Russia. In short, at a time when the United States needs the most help, the prospects for receiving it, with the exception of a few allies, look more worrisome than at any point since perhaps the immediate aftermath of World War II. A Hard Look at Hard Power provides in-depth analysis of the state of key allied militaries. It could not be more timely.