As the United States Air Force air base defense doctrine evolved over the years, implementation and execution errors were occasionally exploited by insurgent forces operating in the areas adjacent to U.S. occupied air bases. Executing unconventional attack methodologies, primarily via stand-off weapons, these insurgents were able to wreak havoc on U.S. and allied air bases, causing massive destruction and the loss of American lives. An examination of the literature from air base (ground) attacks in Korea, Vietnam and at Khobar Towers indicated several problematic areas resonating in all three cases. These common areas include: inadequate intelligence (both organic and external), lack of proper focus on critical infrastructure and insufficient or absent force protection technologies. Many of today's security experts are predicting future attacks on military infrastructure to include stateside and forward-deployed air bases. Today's slightly diverse, yet consistent insurgent enemy, with attack methodologies mirroring those of Korea, Vietnam and Khobar Towers, remains a constant and formidable threat. As the Air Force moves forward with its newly implemented Integrated Base Defense doctrine, specific attention must be paid to improving upon the problem areas from the past. This thesis focuses on the specific problematic areas, and provides policy recommendations for force protection planners.