Dogmatic belief in the dominance of the land offensive influenced decisions that resulted in years of futile bloodletting on the Western Front in World War I. Termed "the cult of the offensive" by scholars of the Great War, faith in the offense became so unshakable in pre-1914 Europe that military organizations dismissed irrelevant numerous indications of its waning power in the face of technological developments favoring the defense. As we know, the belief that airpower is inherently offensive is a recurrent theme in airpower history and doctrine. Given the predilections of airmen for offensive operations, could a cult of the offensive perniciously trap airpower doctrine and lead to similarly disastrous consequences? By drawing on selected historical experiences of the air forces of Great Britain, Israel, and the United States, Maj. John R. Carter, Jr. employs a comparative perspective and rigorous case study methodology to offer a detailed examination of that question. He begins by establishing the theoretical background necessary for case study analysis. Airpower defense is defined as those operations conducted to deny another force's air operations in a designated airspace. Airpower offense consists of those operations in the airspace defended by another, or operations conducted outside of one's own actively defended airspace. Major Carter dissects the relationship between offense and defense to discover that airpower defense enjoys neither an advantage of position nor of time. He thus concludes that traditional Clausewitzian views relative to the power of the defense do not apply to airpower. The author next describes those factors that may inject or reinforce a preferential bias for offense into airpower strategy and doctrine. Major Carter defines a cult of the offensive as an organizational belief in the power of the offense so compelling that a military organization no longer evaluates its offensive doctrine objectively, which leads to his examination of the ramifications postulated to result from an offensive ideology. Drawing on the histories of three services - Great Britain's Royal Air Force from 1918 to 1938, the Israeli Air Force from 1967 to 1973, and the United States Air Force from 1953 to 1965 - Major Carter offers three case studies to determine if the cult of the offensive applies to air forces. He concludes that cults of the offensive have indeed influenced airpower doctrine in the past, and that detailed offensive planning and a critical evaluation of capabilities provide two methods for avoid this potential trap.