As a result of the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet Union, US success during the Gulf War, and other factors, the US military reduced its size in the 1990s. Concurrently, the US military pursued a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) in an effort to offset the reduction in size by gaining efficiency through the application of new technology, techniques, and doctrine. This monograph examines these efforts and draws a comparison between the US efforts in the 90s and the rise of Al Qaeda as a non-state, terrorist, organization. Using Napoleonic warfare and Blitzkrieg as models of RMA, the monograph draws parallels between Napoleon and Al Qaeda and Blitzkrieg and the US military. It identifies the US efforts on RMA as focused at the tactical and operational levels of war while Al Qaeda focused at the strategic level of war. The monograph finishes with recommendations on the future of US efforts at transformation; specifically with regards to integrating all elements of national power and restructuring the interagency process in order to respond to the concept of RMA as advanced by Al Qaeda.