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Allocation, Information and Markets de John Eatwell

Allocation, Information and Markets: The New Palgrave

Editat de John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, Peter Newman
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 15 oct 1989
This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780333495391
ISBN-10: 033349539X
Pagini: 310
Ilustrații: XII, 310 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 17 mm
Greutate: 0.45 kg
Ediția:1989
Editura: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Colecția Palgrave Macmillan
Seria The New Palgrave

Locul publicării:London, United Kingdom

Cuprins

Efficient allocation, S.Reiter; adverse selection, C.Wilson; asymmetric information, A.Postlewaite; auctions, V.L.Smith; bidding, R.Wilson; the coase theorem, R.D.Cooter; decentralization, E.Malivaud; economic organization and transaction costs, S.NM.S.Cheung; exchange, R.Wilson; experimental methods in economics, V.L.Smith; externalities, J.J.Laffont; fraud, E.Karni; hidden actions, moral hazard and contract theory, R.Guesnerie; implicit contracts, C.Azariadis; incentive compatibility, J.O.Ledyard; incentive contracts, E.P.Lazear; incomplete contracts, O.Hart; incomplete markets, C.Wilson; market failure, J.O.Ledyard; mechanism design, R.B.Myerson; moral hazard, Y.Kotowitz; natural selection and evolution, S.G.Winter; organization theory, T.Marschak; perfectly and imperfectly competitive markets, J.Roberts; principal and agent, J.E.Stiglitz; public goods, A.Sandmo; revelation of preferences, J.J.Laffont; search theory, P.Diamond; signalling J.G.Riley; teams, R.Radner.