The Battle of Britain was the first major defeat for the Germans of WWII. The Battle of Britain was an air operation designed to give Germany air superiority over both the English Channel and England. Gaining air superiority was considered by the German Army and Navy as absolutely essential prior to "Operation Sea Lion," the landing and invasion of England. Because the Luftwaffe was never able to establish the requisite air superiority, Sea Lion was cancelled. This paper examines the German Operational Art issues from a historical perspective. It concludes the failure of the Luftwaffe belongs to Reich-Marshall Goring, operational commander for The Battle of Britain. His main failure, as operational commander, was repeadtedly making tactical decisions from the operational level rather than leaving this to on-the-scene tactical commanders. Secondly, he was never able to identify Fighter Command as the British Center of Gravity. Thirdly, he never understood the intelligence advantage gained by the British as a result of their newly invented radar early warning system. As a result, Germany lost the battle.