The broad objective of this ongoing assessment is to determine whether the DoD programs for the care, management, and transition of recovering Service members wounded during deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom were managed effectively and efficiently. Our specific objectives were to evaluate the missions, the policies, and processes of: Military units, beginning with the Army and Marine Corps, established to support the recovery of Service members and their transition to duty status (Active or Reserve Components); DOD programs for Service members affected with Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or to civilian life; and We conducted this assessment in response to a request to the DoD IG made by Congressman Walter B. Jones (R-NC) in February 2009. Congressman Jones received complaints from constituents about incidents that allegedly occurred at the Wounded Warrior Battalion-East (WWBn-East) at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. As a result of a meeting with Congressman Jones and his staff, we agreed to assess Wounded Warrior matters in a systemic approach across DoD, beginning with the Army and the Marine Corps. We interviewed several of Congressman Jones' constituents both prior to and during our site visit to Camp Lejeune to obtain information about the program and the alleged concerns; however, because those constituents were no longer part of the WWBn-East at the time of our site visit, the information they provided was not directly used in support of the observations and conclusions in this report. Rather, this information was used to help frame the interview questions we used during our visit to Camp Lejeune in the fall of 2010. This is the third of multiple assessments that will be conducted at Army and Marine Corps Warrior transition units. To obtain unbiased data, not unduly reflecting the views of either the supporters or detractors of the program, we used a two-pronged approach to select our respondents. First, we determined how many Service members were required to be interviewed, then we applied a simple random sample approach to determine the Service members we should interview, as described in Appendix A. We subsequently performed interviews with Marine Corps wounded, ill, and injured personnel (hereafter referred to as Warriors), to include 64 individual interviews with Marines, and 24 additional Marines in 4 group interviews. Second, we interviewed all available members of the key groups responsible for the Warriors' care. Specifically, we conducted meetings and interviews during our 2-week visit at Camp Lejeune that included unit commanders, staff officers, and WWBn-East military staff, as well as civilian staff and contractors. A list of the meetings and interviews conducted at the Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune and WWBn-East is in Appendix A, along with the scope, methodology, and acronyms of this assessment. The prior coverage of this subject area is discussed in Appendix B. The observations and corresponding recommendations in this report focus on what we learned at Camp Lejeune, but we believe that some of our findings may have implications for other Wounded Warrior units and should be called to the attention of higher headquarters responsible for these programs.