The list of military disasters which the British suffered in India is long, but most of these were rationalised by British military historians by highlighting situational factors which made British defeat certain and inevitable and was in many cases due to circumstances involving overwhelming numerical inferiority, excessive battle exhaustion, adverse weather and terrain etc. The Battle of Chillianwala fought on 13 January 1849 is, however, one odd exception and stands out as a battle in which the British failed to defeat their opponents despite having the advantages of weight of numbers, ideal weather and terrain, superior logistics etc. In Afghanistan the British disaster was explainable since the British force which was destroyed while retreating from Kabul to Jalalabad was a vastly over numbered exhausted and logistically very weak force of some 700 Europeans and 4,500 Native troops which was destroyed by a vastly superior Afghan force in adverse mountain terrain and very cold weather. At Bhurtpore the British failure to capture the mud fortress was ascribed by a British military historian to lack of adequate artillery. At Chillianwala a British Army which had a high European troop component large number Sepoy (regiments), sufficient artillery, two heavy cavalry brigades to ensure that no one could surprise the British army, excellent logistics, little campaign exhaustion having fought no major battle since assumption of hostilities, winter weather negating the possibility of heatstroke and cholera the worst killers of white soldiers in India, failed to defeat the Sikhs. Chillianwala thus stands out as a battle which changed Indian perceptions about British military effectiveness and had a direct link with the "Great Sepoy Rebellion" or "The Indian War of Independence" of 1857