Auction Theory
Autor Vijay Krishnaen Limba Engleză Hardback – 28 sep 2009
- Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions
- New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications
- New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780123745071
ISBN-10: 0123745071
Pagini: 336
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 19 mm
Greutate: 0.64 kg
Ediția:Revised
Editura: Elsevier
Locul publicării:United Kingdom
ISBN-10: 0123745071
Pagini: 336
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 19 mm
Greutate: 0.64 kg
Ediția:Revised
Editura: Elsevier
Locul publicării:United Kingdom
Public țintă
Graduate students and professors working in finance, economics, and industrial organization, and professionals learning about or developing auctions, either in a university setting or in industry.Cuprins
I Single Object Auctions
Private Value Auctions
The Revenue Equivalence Principle
Qualifications and Extensions
Mechanism Design
Auctions with Interdependent Values
The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle
Asymmetries and Other Complications
Efficiency and the English Auction
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
Bidding Rings
II Multiple Object Auctions
An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions
Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values
Some Revenue Considerations
Sequential Sales
Nonidentical Objects
Packages and Positions
Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values
III Appendices
Continuous Distributions
Stochastic Orders
Order Statistics
Affiliated Random Variables
Some Linear Algebra
Private Value Auctions
The Revenue Equivalence Principle
Qualifications and Extensions
Mechanism Design
Auctions with Interdependent Values
The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle
Asymmetries and Other Complications
Efficiency and the English Auction
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
Bidding Rings
II Multiple Object Auctions
An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions
Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values
Some Revenue Considerations
Sequential Sales
Nonidentical Objects
Packages and Positions
Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values
III Appendices
Continuous Distributions
Stochastic Orders
Order Statistics
Affiliated Random Variables
Some Linear Algebra
Recenzii
"Krishna’s superb Auction Theory is an ideal text and reference because his clear and precise exposition distills the vast literature and provides excellent motivation, examples, exercises, and connections to commercial applications." --Robert B. Wilson, Stanford University
"On its publication in 2002, Vijay Krishna's book immediately became a central reference in auction theory. But the subject has continued to develop, and so we're very fortunate that Krishna has now updated the text." --Eric Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study, Nobel Laureate in Economics
"On its publication in 2002, Vijay Krishna's book immediately became a central reference in auction theory. But the subject has continued to develop, and so we're very fortunate that Krishna has now updated the text." --Eric Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study, Nobel Laureate in Economics