More than 107 countries have some form of explicit deposit insurance according to the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey conducted by the World Bank. This book explores the diverse deposit insurance regulations across countries, ranging from full to partial coverage, from explicit to implicit appliance, from compulsory to non-compulsory, among the G-20 countries. It also explores the differences of premium implementation. The book focuses on the need for deposit insurance systems given their ability to prevent bank runs, which usually lead to asset liquidation and potentially to bank failure. The book looks closely at how to properly design a safety net and balance two competing goals: ensuring stability in the financial system when liquidity and solvency problems arise while minimizing moral hazard. The book examines these various deposit insurance schemes and their ability to maintain the stability of the financial system by protecting the critical financial intermediation function of banks and their role in the national payments system, and will be of interest to researchers, students, and policymakers of banking, banking regulation, and international finance.