This monograph examines Soviet tactical reconnaissance doctrine, organizations, and capability. The Soviet capability is analyzed using their own criteria for the conduct of tactical reconnaissance operations: purposefulness, aggressiveness, continuity, timeliness, and reliability. Soviet and Warsaw Pact Army documents (in translation) are used extensively. A recent Combined Arms Center study concluded that the US Army's counter reconnaissance doctrine, force structure, and training are deficient. Beginning with this assertion, the monograph briefly explores the historical and current relationship between effective tactical reconnaissance and success on the battlefield. Then a detailed analysis of the Soviet reconnaissance capability determines that, despite difficulties in executing their doctrine, the Soviets possess a significant capability for "seeing" through the depth of the modern battlefield. The monograph stresses the correlation between the Soviet reconnaissance effort and their doctrine of developing operations into the tactical and operational depth of the battlefield. Consequently, Soviet reconnaissance patrols will operation in American rear areas. The monograph concludes with the suggestion that the US Army should place greater emphasis on counter reconnaissance in its own rear areas - in effect, blinding the enemy.