When the US arrived in Afghanistan and a ham handed attempt was made by Pakistans military dictator General Musharraf to chastise the FATA. It was a rude shock to the Pakistani military - those who it had regarded as its servile tools of policy were now retaliating and attacking the Pakistani State who they saw as having betrayed the ideals that it stood for. The key to dealing with the Pashtuns is to engage them and trade goods with them rather than trading bullets. There is famous Pashto saying that if treated politely and with grace a Pashtun will readily go to hell with you but if treated with aggression and contempt a Pashtun wil even refuse an open invitation to paradise. US forces in Afghanistan with all their military and armament superiority received a rude shock by Pakistan's FATA now being used as the bastion and base of many militant groups fighting against US forces in Afghanistan. When crude attempts to crush the FATA tribals by both Pakistani military and the US failed it dawned on the decision makers that offering the tribals of FATA an ALP may be a better alternative than drones or bullets. This realization however was not translated into practice thanks to the lethargy of key decision makers on both sides who still were not fully convinced about ALP being better than the power of the gun. Repeated failures to pacify the FATA or curb militancy in both Pakistan and Afghanistan have however convinced policy makers in USA, NATO States and Pakistan that ALP in the shape of ROZ was the best strategy to bring peace and security in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The ROZ however may be a total failure, that is if and when it is implemented. It is too little too late. The USA occupied Afghanistan in November 2001 and its almost more than 10 years since then and yet the United States has failed to win the hearts and minds of a substantial part of Afghan populace. The reason lies in abject failure of USA's economic policy. This in turn has led to a counterproductive situation. There is nothing inevitable in history but those who cannot identify the critical time span in any crisis and who fail to seize it by the horns are bound to fail. Such unfortunately has been the case with US strategy in Afghanistan. The US President failed to find the right strategic talent for Afghanistan and thus thrust mediocre US policy makers on Afghanistan who neither knew, nor recognised anything higher than their shallow mediocrity The main thrust of USA's policy in Afghanistan was to construct roads and schools and clinics. These were important but no substantial class of stakeholders which had a vested interest in success of US policy inside Afghanistan was created. No major employment opportunities were created. No major effort was made to encourage private enterprise. No major attempt was made to privatise Afghanistan's main economic potential i.e its massive custom revenues most of which do not land in government coffers and are skimmed away by corrupt custom officials as bribes and by smugglers as profits once Afghan imports are re-exported i.e smuggled to Pakistan. US approach in short was bureaucratic, conservative and in final summing up timid Bearing Point a large US firm got the major contract for economic reform. It hired Americans and expatriates who would not have got any decent job in USA or even a medium level country. In addition they hired some Afghan Americans who came to Afghanistan for a short term period, to make a quick buck and go back to their relatively far more comfortable permanent places on the California coast.