The purpose of this book is to examine the primary factors influencing the defense budgeting decisions of the Truman and Bush 41 Administrations. In particular, the work examines events following the end of the World War II and the Cold War. This examination and analysis should be of interest for the Obama Administration due to the many apparent parallels between these administrations. Like the Obama Administration, Truman and Bush faced an uncertain threat environment, economic concerns including inflation and high employment, and the challenge of navigating the nation through the end of a war. By understanding how these factors influenced each respective administration, Obama can better construct tomorrows defense budgets. There are four primary budget models, tied closely with environmental factors, which help explain the defense budget decisions made by the previous administrations. These four models include the historical, threat, economy, and strategy-based methods. Depending on the context, each of these factors and models pull or attempt to loosen the nations purse strings. Concerns with the economy consistently pull the purse strings close, while the nations threat perceptions justified defense expenditures. The nations geopolitical goals and strategies can influence defense budgets in either direction. The historical model is the most dependent on context. The nations behavior and defense budget can gain its own momentum, thereby influencing the process. Prior to World War II, the nations cultural norm was to maintain a small military force; therefore, the nation quickly demobilized and cut defense funding at the end of the nations conflicts. In the aftermath of the Cold War, it appears the nations culture norm was transformed and the nation relied on its military to create jobs and export democracy throughout the world. This new norm supported defense budgets. The book concludes that Truman, by 1947, cut the nations defense budget 90 percent due to his focus on the nations economy. Bush also cut the defense budget due to economic concerns, but only by 28 percent over an eight-year period. The nations new historical norm of maintaining a large military infrastructure kept the defense cuts small. In Trumans case, the nations cultural habit of maintaining a small military and quick demobilization eliminated any hurdles to defense cuts. In addition to the economy, Trumans national security strategy relied on economic strength instead of military strength. Trumans strategy sought free trade, an establishment of international governing body along with an allied police force to prevent war. If these strategies did not work, Truman held the atomic bomb monopoly to insure against mistakes. Bushs new world order required a strong military able to project forces quickly; therefore, Bushs strategy supported the defense budget. With regard to threats, each administration faced uncertainty. From 1945 to 1950, Truman couched Soviet threats in terms of a contest of political wills rather than military capabilities. His desire to achieve world peace required Soviet cooperation, not an arms competition. On the other hand, Bush faced the threats of terrorism, WMD, and ballistic missile proliferation. For Bush, a strong and capable military was the nations protector. President Obama, facing a $1.2 trillion deficit and inheriting a $12 trillion debt, is feeling the economic pressures to cut defense spending. In order to make any substantive cuts, he must appreciate the momentum of the nations current defense budget and the influence it exerts on the budgeting process. The nations new historical norm supports a larger defense budget than perhaps needed. Obama will need to construct a security strategy less reliant on military strength to accomplish objectives, and begin the process of justifying a threat evaluation that is, well, less threatening.