The United States Army is currently implementing a new manning initiative called Unit Focused Stability (UFS). This new personnel program is designed to maximize unit cohesion in Brigade Combat Teams by replacing the Individual Replacement System (IRS) with a unit-centric manning system. While added cohesion within combat units is a positive change for the Army at large, it may bring significant second- and third-order effects that adversely affect Army personnel. The impact of UFS on the officer corps will be especially troublesome. Unfortunately, the Army has yet to conduct detailed analysis on the side effects of the UFS or to identify the requisite changes across other personnel functions that must complement the switch to UFS. This monograph endeavors to begin such analysis by answering the following research question: Will a change in the officer promotion system help to ensure the long-term success of UFS? This monograph begins with an analysis of the UFS model and its impact on the officer corps. The examination identifies thirteen friction points for officers in the rank of lieutenant through colonel. These friction points add up to one thing: significant potential for the eventual failure of UFS. As individual officers experience the friction associated with UFS, they will exempt themselves from the program. This paper presents historical evidence to demonstrate that without officer support and participation, unit manning initiatives will eventually fail. Next, this study examines the officer promotion system to determine its underlying assumptions, their associated implementation principles, and the specific laws and policies that have stemmed from them. The monograph concludes that many of the fundamental assumptions and principles of the officer promotion system are outdated and will contribute to the friction of UFS. Additionally, an exploration into the Defense Officer Personnel Act of 1980 (DOPMA), Department of Defense policy, and Army regulations concludes that any significant change to the foundation of Army officer promotions must be accomplished through changes to Title 10, United States Code. Finally, this monograph proposes three possible changes to the Army officer promotion system. The first proposal is the adoption of an up-or-stay promotion system. The second option is a new career model with longer career timelines, slower promotions, and wider promotion eligibility zones. The third proposal is the implementation of an event-driven promotion system that divorces promotions from time pressure altogether. Of the three proposals, the second does the most to alleviate the friction points that will be created by UFS. The monograph concludes that Army must change its officer promotion system to ensure the longevity of UFS and the future health of the officer corps.