This book examines the ambiguities of Chinese strategic and military thought and introduces a new concept of Chinese Strategic Art to help analysts understand how the People's Republic of China (PRC) thinks about and practices strategy. This book argues that there is a distinct Chinese strategic culture which combines with the principles of strategic theory to create Chinese Strategic Art. The study uses a qualitative case study methodology and applies the Chinese Strategic Art framework to three case studies to evaluate and assess the subjective conditions that influence the PRC leadership's decision to use military force. The three case studies are: the Korean War, the Sino-Vietnamese War, 1979, and the Sino-Taiwanese conflict. The study finds that the PRC will use military force as a means of developing or affirming relationships with other countries, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. The study also finds that the distinct holistic approach of Chinese strategists, which focuses on interrelationships and dialectical understanding, influences their use of military force. The study of Chinese Strategic Art is beneficial to US military officers as it not only expands understanding of the PRC's strategic decision making, but may also complement US strategic thinking.