Operation Iraqi Freedom was innovative, flexible, and achieved stunningly rapid success, properly setting the stage for conflict termination and resolution. Upon announcing the transition to conflict resolution, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld revealed that the U.S.-led coalition was attempting unfamiliar and unique methods to resolve the conflict. U.S. policy in Iraq created a two-track process, security and politics, under the supervision of the U.S. Department of defense (DoD). This Research Project analyzes U.S. Policy in Iraq regarding conflict resolution. As is evident with the current situation in Iraq, finishing a war is more problematic than starting one. Many who are personally involved with the process declare that U.S. policy has harvested tremendous success towards Iraq regaining sovereignty. Many others, including the U.S. installed Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), the UN, other UN Security Council members, and members of the U.S. Congress, however, question the legitimacy of U.S. policy and the effect that it is having on reestablishing Iraqi sovereignty. This book first examines initial U.S. policy in Iraq, and its perceived strengths and weaknesses. Then it offers a solution by looking at three current policy options on the part of the U.S., the IGC, and the French juxtapositioned against the historical example of three conflict resolution case studies involving the U.S. This proposal can improve legitimacy in all facets of the project, produce long lasting conflict resolution in Iraq, and potentially stabilize the region. In the shadows of the innovative and flexible "war" plan that rapidly terminated major combat operations, the U.S. administration has to be bold enough to design and execute a similarly designed "peace" plan. Furthermore, these considerations are relevant to future military interventions considering this nation's current Military Strategy and increased global commitments in a hostile strategic environment.