In October 1993, the Quick Reaction Force Headquarters in Mogadishu, Somalia observed, "convoys are more vulnerable to attack than ground maneuver forces and should be planned and executed as a combat operation." During the period from 1993 to 2012, every major United States Army operation confirmed this reality. Logistics forces conducting ground convoys suffered 17 percent, or 167 soldiers, of all Army personnel killed in action during both Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom between November 2001 and September 2010. Whether high intensity as experienced during the March 2003 Iraq invasion or low intensity as seen during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti from 1994 to 1995, sustainment organizations maintained the enduring requirement to conduct supply distribution operations with armed convoy escorts. Assumptions exist, based on the enduring concept of Air Land Battle introduced in the 1980s with Field Manual 100-5, that the Army conducted convoys as a rear area operation and that the rear area is secure. Sustainment brigade doctrine, published in 2009, countered that claim, indicating that, "supply routes are assumed not be secure on a high threat area." The asymmetric conflicts over the past 20 years were nonlinear and featured no rear area or front line. The Army clearly entered an era requiring armed escorts to ensure convoy protection This book examines multiple options available to operational level planners when considering and building theater distribution capability. Primarily, it focuses on the benefits and shortfalls of both internal and external armed convoy escort. Additionally, it provides historical examples of convoy operations in asymmetrical environments and the associated security challenges. Finally, this monograph offers multiple convoy security solutions for operational planners, force managers, and the sustainment doctrine community to consider for review and implementation.