There is a lack of attention to the aftermath of a deployed cyber weapon: There is no mechanism for the assignment of accountability for the restoration of affected infrastructure and remediation of violation of established laws of war after cyber attacks occur. This study analyzes International Humanitarian Law and international treaties as they apply to the cyber post-conflict period and explores current jus post bellum frameworks, which can be used to design a cyber-warfare jus post bellum framework. It also analyzes analogies to traditional warfare in the damage assessment and aid provided during the recovery period of the 1998 Kosovo and the 2003 Iraq Wars. It also discusses the available international cyber organizations. As an example, the study analyzes responses to cyber-attacks in a case study involving South Korea and North Korea. Additionally, this study examines the related issues of the effects of deploying a cyber-weapon, the ways to establish acceptable levels of attribution, the challenges of cyber-damage assessments, and the ability to contain and reverse cyber attacks. This thesis proposes a cyber-warfare jus post bellum framework, with emphasis on prevention and cyber weapons control, proposes cyberattack relief-effort actions, and offers a post-cyberattack cost checklist.