The Army has begun the process of relearning and integrating deception into doctrine and operations. The state of doctrine and training both appear to be in need of aggressive review and modification. History shows that it is a potent combat multiplier that can be decisive in gaining surprise and initiative. History shows the costs of these operations to be less than one would expect. The risks appear relatively low as well. Benefits, . on the other hand, are uniformly high when compared to cost and risk. The 1989 Army Deception White Paper attempted to set the azimuth for deception integration. It failed to provide the required urgency and priority. This thesis uses the premise of 'What the White Paper should have said" to explore the subject. The paper makes recommendations based on interviews with senior defense officials, including Generals Starry, Cavazos, and Livsey; Dr. Edward Luttwak, and several experts in the field of deception. The recommendations address doctrine development, parallel training, and the integration of deception into planning. Training events such as BCTP, the NTC, JRTC, and the ARTEP must include deception if deception is to become an effective component of Army doctrine and operations."