This study investigates the contributions of the U.S. Army's coastal fortification system to execute the coastal defense policy of the United States, in view of the tremendous technological advances and developmental shortfalls it had to contend with over the course of its existence. The concept presented is one showing the ultimate failure of the entire fortification network to maintain its viability to defend critical harbors when individual fortifications underwent their baptisms of fire. Until the conclusion of World War II, the U.S. Army has traditionally been the instrument entrusted with executing the land-based element of American coastal defense policy. The overall challenge was to organize a coastal defense establishment properly resourced to meet any threat within the fiscal restraints imposed by the national leadership. The book explains the development of the coastal fortification system in relation to the Army's concept of organizing and equipping organizations to conduct operations in support of its mission and the technological impacts influencing coastal fortifications. This book will promote the lessons from the Army's failure to continually develop a system capable of adapting to technological changes and will serve as an example of the consequences of flawed policy decision making for future force developers.