Before the first American ground forces ever landed in North Africa, Britain and her allies fought a long and bloody desert war against the Axis coalition. For 29 months, Britain fought the Italians and Germans. This study reviews the early North African campaigns and shows that the British pursued a strategy of fighting the Axis powers in a secondary theater of war and that this strategy evolved more by circumstance than design. This study shows that the British correctly estimated the strategic situation in North Africa and followed a difficult, yet successful, strategy that diverted Axis resources from other fronts and set the stage for the Axis defeat in both North Africa and Europe. This study covers the period from 10 June 1940, when Britain went to war in North Africa, until 8 November 1942 when Allied forces conducted landings in Northwest Africa under the code name Operation Torch. This study concludes: that the British followed a succesful strategy, that these campaigns illustrate the political nature of theater warfare and command, that the British Middle-East Command was a successful joint and combined command structure, that these campaigns illustrate the importance of properly estimating, planning and providing adequate logistical support to execute theater strategy, and that the British and Americans learned other operational, technical, and tactical lessons from these early campaigns.