Eisenhower Republicanism: Pursuing the Middle Way
Autor Steven Wagneren Limba Engleză Hardback – 15 aug 2006
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s election to the presidency in 1952 brought an end to two decades of Democratic rule in the White House. His landslide victory, however, masked intense factionalism within the Republican Party. Whereas conservatives were eager to reverse the domestic and foreign policies of past administrations, liberal Republicans favored active federal involvement in Americans’ lives and an internationalist approach to affairs abroad. As political historian Steven Wagner demonstrates, Eisenhower sought a “middle way” between Democrats to his left and conservatives to his right.
In American political culture, those who describe themselves as “middle of the road” are often portrayed as unwilling to take a stand or lacking in political sophistication. This was not the case with Eisenhower, whose “middle way” was the result of careful consideration. Despite his party’s commitment to limited government, free enterprise, and individual initiative, Eisenhower believed that, in some cases, the federal government needed to intervene.
Eisenhower’s enormous popularity with the American people assured him reelection and high approval ratings throughout his two terms of office. This popularity did not, however, translate into legislative success; his proposals were often defeated by an unlikely coalition of liberals and conservatives. Nor did Eisenhower’s popularity carry over to his party, a fact driven home by the defeat of his vice president, Richard Nixon, in the 1960 presidential election. In the resulting battle for control of the party, conservatives prevailed. Wagner concludes with a candid discussion of the legacy of “Eisenhower Republicanism” and the ways in which the subsequent conservative victory has continued to shape the party to this day.
In American political culture, those who describe themselves as “middle of the road” are often portrayed as unwilling to take a stand or lacking in political sophistication. This was not the case with Eisenhower, whose “middle way” was the result of careful consideration. Despite his party’s commitment to limited government, free enterprise, and individual initiative, Eisenhower believed that, in some cases, the federal government needed to intervene.
Eisenhower’s enormous popularity with the American people assured him reelection and high approval ratings throughout his two terms of office. This popularity did not, however, translate into legislative success; his proposals were often defeated by an unlikely coalition of liberals and conservatives. Nor did Eisenhower’s popularity carry over to his party, a fact driven home by the defeat of his vice president, Richard Nixon, in the 1960 presidential election. In the resulting battle for control of the party, conservatives prevailed. Wagner concludes with a candid discussion of the legacy of “Eisenhower Republicanism” and the ways in which the subsequent conservative victory has continued to shape the party to this day.
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780875803623
ISBN-10: 0875803628
Pagini: 189
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 20 mm
Greutate: 0.44 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Northern Illinois University Press
Colecția Northern Illinois University Press
ISBN-10: 0875803628
Pagini: 189
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 20 mm
Greutate: 0.44 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Northern Illinois University Press
Colecția Northern Illinois University Press
Recenzii
“Well written … the argument is logical and well structured. The research and scholarship are impressive and the author’s conclusions are sound.”—Nicol Rae, Florida International University
“Wagner provides the first in-depth analysis of the president’s troubled relationship with his own Republican Party and the battles over his major domestic policies and programs.”—Richard V. Damms, Mississippi State University
“Wagner provides the first in-depth analysis of the president’s troubled relationship with his own Republican Party and the battles over his major domestic policies and programs.”—Richard V. Damms, Mississippi State University
Notă biografică
Steven Wagner is Associate Professor of History at Missouri Southern State University.
Cuprins
Table of Contents
Abbreviations
Introduction
1 A Floor over the Pit of Personal Disaster
2 Giving Labor an Equal Voice
3 A Program for All Farmers and for All America
4 Civil Rights, States' Rights, and Federal Responsibilities
5 Republican Internationalism
6 The Politics of Modern Republicanism
7 An Echo or a Choice?
Conclusion
Notes
Works Cited
Index
Introduction
1 A Floor over the Pit of Personal Disaster
2 Giving Labor an Equal Voice
3 A Program for All Farmers and for All America
4 Civil Rights, States' Rights, and Federal Responsibilities
5 Republican Internationalism
6 The Politics of Modern Republicanism
7 An Echo or a Choice?
Conclusion
Notes
Works Cited
Index
Descriere
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s election to the presidency in 1952 brought an end to two decades of Democratic rule in the White House. His landslide victory, however, masked intense factionalism within the Republican Party. Whereas conservatives were eager to reverse the domestic and foreign policies of past administrations, liberal Republicans favored active federal involvement in Americans’ lives and an internationalist approach to affairs abroad. As political historian Steven Wagner demonstrates, Eisenhower sought a “middle way” between Democrats to his left and conservatives to his right.
In American political culture, those who describe themselves as “middle of the road” are often portrayed as unwilling to take a stand or lacking in political sophistication. This was not the case with Eisenhower, whose “middle way” was the result of careful consideration. Despite his party’s commitment to limited government, free enterprise, and individual initiative, Eisenhower believed that, in some cases, the federal government needed to intervene.
Eisenhower’s enormous popularity with the American people assured him reelection and high approval ratings throughout his two terms of office. This popularity did not, however, translate into legislative success; his proposals were often defeated by an unlikely coalition of liberals and conservatives. Nor did Eisenhower’s popularity carry over to his party, a fact driven home by the defeat of his vice president, Richard Nixon, in the 1960 presidential election. In the resulting battle for control of the party, conservatives prevailed. Wagner concludes with a candid discussion of the legacy of “Eisenhower Republicanism” and the ways in which the subsequent conservative victory has continued to shape the party to this day.
In American political culture, those who describe themselves as “middle of the road” are often portrayed as unwilling to take a stand or lacking in political sophistication. This was not the case with Eisenhower, whose “middle way” was the result of careful consideration. Despite his party’s commitment to limited government, free enterprise, and individual initiative, Eisenhower believed that, in some cases, the federal government needed to intervene.
Eisenhower’s enormous popularity with the American people assured him reelection and high approval ratings throughout his two terms of office. This popularity did not, however, translate into legislative success; his proposals were often defeated by an unlikely coalition of liberals and conservatives. Nor did Eisenhower’s popularity carry over to his party, a fact driven home by the defeat of his vice president, Richard Nixon, in the 1960 presidential election. In the resulting battle for control of the party, conservatives prevailed. Wagner concludes with a candid discussion of the legacy of “Eisenhower Republicanism” and the ways in which the subsequent conservative victory has continued to shape the party to this day.