The purpose of this monograph is to analyze the Heavy Brigade Combat Team's (HBCT) engineer force structure to answer the question: Does the HBCT have the necessary embedded engineer capabilities to conduct full spectrum operations, rapidly transitioning between stability and major combat operations. Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Hezbollah - Israeli Conflict of 2006 illustrate the vast array of threats that the U.S. military faces in executing the Global War on Terror. These threats require the Army's primary tactical warfighting systems, the brigade combat teams (BCTs), to operate across the full spectrum of conflict. The Army constructed the HBCT for optimization in open and mixed terrain against conventional and irregular threats; however its embedded engineer forces have been reduced from a battalion to a single company. One engineer company does not provide the capabilities required for the HBCT to execute full spectrum operations; consequently the HBCT must rely on engineer augmentation from the engineer force pool to execute specific operations. Systems theory and systemic perspectives provide valuable insight into the interrelationship of the HBCT's embedded units. The HBCT is greater than the sum of its individual parts. Subsequently, if one of the interrelated variables is unable to perform its battlefield functions then the HBCT is also unable to perform its battlefield functions. Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom provide valuable insight into the importance of embedding engineer capabilities in order to conduct combat operations, particularly major combat operations. Interviews from senior engineer commanders further highlight the Engineer Regiment's concerns with the modular BCT force structure. The HBCT's reliance on external engineer forces has created several issues and areas of concern. These issues include the contradictions to systemic thinking and perspectives, reduction in HBCT engineer capabilities, availability and integration of engineer augmentees, the command and control of engineer operations, and engineer specific training shortfalls. Recommendations provided include: 1) reestablishing the HBCT's engineer battalion, 2) reestablishing the HBCT engineer battalion command structure, and/or 3) establishing two HBCT engineer companies. These recommendations help improve the HBCT's embedded engineer capabilities and transform the HBCT into the Army's primary tactical warfighting system that is optimized for high intensity operations in open and mixed terrain against conventional and irregular threats.