Essays on Ethics, Social Behaviour, and Scientific Explanation: Theory and Decision Library, cartea 12
Autor J.C. Harsanyien Limba Engleză Paperback – 30 sep 1980
Din seria Theory and Decision Library
- 15% Preț: 599.61 lei
- 15% Preț: 581.62 lei
- Preț: 382.57 lei
- 18% Preț: 1231.64 lei
- 18% Preț: 1229.28 lei
- 15% Preț: 642.83 lei
- 18% Preț: 950.33 lei
- 18% Preț: 1234.94 lei
- Preț: 391.61 lei
- Preț: 382.75 lei
- 15% Preț: 643.16 lei
- 15% Preț: 639.73 lei
- Preț: 399.67 lei
- 18% Preț: 1843.73 lei
- 15% Preț: 645.79 lei
- 15% Preț: 646.43 lei
- 18% Preț: 1228.96 lei
- 15% Preț: 642.03 lei
- 15% Preț: 589.47 lei
- Preț: 383.33 lei
- Preț: 395.09 lei
- 18% Preț: 949.55 lei
- Preț: 389.11 lei
- 15% Preț: 646.94 lei
- 15% Preț: 698.94 lei
- Preț: 354.21 lei
- 18% Preț: 1218.06 lei
- 18% Preț: 962.03 lei
- Preț: 385.08 lei
- Preț: 396.24 lei
- 18% Preț: 2482.38 lei
- 18% Preț: 953.82 lei
- 18% Preț: 1233.06 lei
- Preț: 399.29 lei
Preț: 943.43 lei
Preț vechi: 1150.52 lei
-18% Nou
Puncte Express: 1415
Preț estimativ în valută:
180.55€ • 187.06$ • 150.68£
180.55€ • 187.06$ • 150.68£
Carte tipărită la comandă
Livrare economică 21 martie-04 aprilie
Preluare comenzi: 021 569.72.76
Specificații
ISBN-13: 9789027711861
ISBN-10: 9027711860
Pagini: 272
Ilustrații: 278 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 14 mm
Greutate: 0.39 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1980
Editura: SPRINGER NETHERLANDS
Colecția Springer
Seria Theory and Decision Library
Locul publicării:Dordrecht, Netherlands
ISBN-10: 9027711860
Pagini: 272
Ilustrații: 278 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 14 mm
Greutate: 0.39 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1980
Editura: SPRINGER NETHERLANDS
Colecția Springer
Seria Theory and Decision Library
Locul publicării:Dordrecht, Netherlands
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
A / Ethics and Welfare Economics.- I. Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking.- II. Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.- III. Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives.- IV. Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory.- V. Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: Do Welfare Economists Have a Special Exemption from Bayesian Rationality?.- B / Rational-Choice and Game Theoretical Models of Social Behavior.- VI. Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior.- VII. Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories.- VIII. Game Theory and the Analysis of International Conflicts.- IX. Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games.- X. Measurement of Social Power in n-Person Reciprocal Power Situations.- XI. A Bargaining Model for Social Status in Informal Groups and Formal Organizations.- C / Scientific Explanation.- XII. Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in Social Science.- XIII. Popper’s Improbability Criterion for the Choice of Scientific Hypotheses.