Eyes on Spies: Congress and the United States Intelligence Community
Autor Amy B. Zegarten Limba Engleză Hardback – 7 sep 2011
WHY CONGRESS'S BIGGEST INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROBLEMS LIE WITH ...CONGRESS
Ten years after 9/11, the least reformed part of America's intelligence system is not the CIA or FBI but the US Congress. In Eyes on Spies, Amy Zegart examines the weaknesses of U.S. intelligence oversight and why those deficiencies have persisted, despite the unprecedented importance of intelligence in today's environment. She argues that many of the biggest oversight problems lie with Congress—the institution, not the parties or personalities—showing how Congress has collectively and persistently tied its own hands in overseeing intelligence.
Supporting sound logic with extensive data, the author offers a comparative analysis of oversight activities of intelligence with other policy areas to show that Congress is not overseeing nearly as much in intelligence as in other policy domains. Electoral incentives, she reveals, explain why. Zegart also identifies two key institutional weaknesses: one, the rules, procedures, and practices that have hindered the development of legislative expertise in intelligence and, two, committee jurisdictions and policies that have fragmented Congress's budgetary power over executive branch intelligence agencies. She concludes that, unfortunately, electoral incentives on the outside and the zero-sum nature of committee power on the inside provide powerful reasons for Congress to continue hobbling its own oversight capabilities.
Ten years after 9/11, the least reformed part of America's intelligence system is not the CIA or FBI but the US Congress. In Eyes on Spies, Amy Zegart examines the weaknesses of U.S. intelligence oversight and why those deficiencies have persisted, despite the unprecedented importance of intelligence in today's environment. She argues that many of the biggest oversight problems lie with Congress—the institution, not the parties or personalities—showing how Congress has collectively and persistently tied its own hands in overseeing intelligence.
Supporting sound logic with extensive data, the author offers a comparative analysis of oversight activities of intelligence with other policy areas to show that Congress is not overseeing nearly as much in intelligence as in other policy domains. Electoral incentives, she reveals, explain why. Zegart also identifies two key institutional weaknesses: one, the rules, procedures, and practices that have hindered the development of legislative expertise in intelligence and, two, committee jurisdictions and policies that have fragmented Congress's budgetary power over executive branch intelligence agencies. She concludes that, unfortunately, electoral incentives on the outside and the zero-sum nature of committee power on the inside provide powerful reasons for Congress to continue hobbling its own oversight capabilities.
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780817912840
ISBN-10: 0817912843
Pagini: 144
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 5 mm
Greutate: 0.36 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Hoover Institution Press
Colecția Hoover Institution Press
ISBN-10: 0817912843
Pagini: 144
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 5 mm
Greutate: 0.36 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Hoover Institution Press
Colecția Hoover Institution Press
Notă biografică
Amy Zegart is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and an affiliated faculty member at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. She has been featured in the National Journal as one of the ten most influential experts in intelligence reform.
Cuprins
List of Tables and Figures
Acknowledgments
Chapter One: Introduction
Chapter Two: What Does Good Oversight Look Like, Anyway?
Chapter Three: Goldilocks and the Intelligence Oversight Literature
Chapter Four: Policemen, Firefighters, and Spooks: How Oversight Varies Across Policy Domains
(with Julie Quinn)
Chapter Five: Oversight Weapons Gone Weak: Expertise and Budgetary Authority
Chapter Six: Conclusion
About the Author
About the Hoover Institution’s Koret–Taube Task Force on National Security and Law
Index
Acknowledgments
Chapter One: Introduction
Chapter Two: What Does Good Oversight Look Like, Anyway?
Chapter Three: Goldilocks and the Intelligence Oversight Literature
Chapter Four: Policemen, Firefighters, and Spooks: How Oversight Varies Across Policy Domains
(with Julie Quinn)
Chapter Five: Oversight Weapons Gone Weak: Expertise and Budgetary Authority
Chapter Six: Conclusion
About the Author
About the Hoover Institution’s Koret–Taube Task Force on National Security and Law
Index
Textul de pe ultima copertă
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE—DESTINED TO DISAPPOINT
In the twenty-first century, intelligence has eclipsed military firepower as the nation's most important line of defense. But intelligence agencies cannot go it alone. Legislative oversight, done well, ensures that the intelligence community gets the resources it needs and deploys those resources to maximum effect. In Eyes on Spies, Amy Zegart examines the weaknesses of US intelligence oversight and why those deficiencies have persisted, despite the unprecedented importance of intelligence in today's environment. She argues that many of the biggest oversight problems lie with Congress—the institution, not the parties or personalities—showing how Congress has collectively and persistently tied its own hands in overseeing intelligence.
Zegart also identifies two key institutional weaknesses: one, the rules, procedures, and practices that have hindered the development of legislative expertise in intelligence and, two, committee jurisdictions and policies that have fragmented Congress's budgetary power over executive branch intelligence agencies. She reveals how electoral incentives on the outside and the zero-sum nature of committee power on the inside provide powerful reasons for Congress to continue hobbling its own oversight capabilities.
In the twenty-first century, intelligence has eclipsed military firepower as the nation's most important line of defense. But intelligence agencies cannot go it alone. Legislative oversight, done well, ensures that the intelligence community gets the resources it needs and deploys those resources to maximum effect. In Eyes on Spies, Amy Zegart examines the weaknesses of US intelligence oversight and why those deficiencies have persisted, despite the unprecedented importance of intelligence in today's environment. She argues that many of the biggest oversight problems lie with Congress—the institution, not the parties or personalities—showing how Congress has collectively and persistently tied its own hands in overseeing intelligence.
Zegart also identifies two key institutional weaknesses: one, the rules, procedures, and practices that have hindered the development of legislative expertise in intelligence and, two, committee jurisdictions and policies that have fragmented Congress's budgetary power over executive branch intelligence agencies. She reveals how electoral incentives on the outside and the zero-sum nature of committee power on the inside provide powerful reasons for Congress to continue hobbling its own oversight capabilities.
Descriere
Amy Zegart examines the weaknesses of US intelligence oversight and why those deficiencies have persisted, despite the unprecedented importance of intelligence in today's environment. She argues that many of the biggest oversight problems lie with Congress—the institution, not the parties or personalities—showing how Congress has collectively and persistently tied its own hands in overseeing intelligence.