As the DoD ends its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, it finds itself transitioning to leaner force structures and reduced budgets. The current methods for sustaining ground forces do not meet the criteria of both the President and the Commandant that the Marine Corps needs to be a light, efficient, and self-sustaining temporary guest of the nation that we are operating in. The way the Marine Corps is provisioned is influenced by a variety of organizations and processes, over which they have limited control except at the tactical level. An emphasis on conducting joint logistics and on using the most efficient means of procuring, delivering, and preparing food supplies has led to a web of interdependence upon other services, government agencies, and even agreements with other nations. This paper examines how ground forces are provisioned, and what led to doing it that way. The extravagence of the contracted facilities overseas indicates there is a better way to solve the problem, but research reveals a complex relationship between industry and the military where profit margins often outweigh more tactically sound solutions. This paper offers factors to consider when faced with the future reality of restrained resources.