Handbook of the Economics of Matching: Handbooks in Economics, cartea 1
Pierre A. Chiappori, Bernard Salanie, Yeok-Koo Cheen Limba Engleză Hardback – dec 2024
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780443314667
ISBN-10: 0443314667
Pagini: 1000
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 mm
Editura: ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Seria Handbooks in Economics
ISBN-10: 0443314667
Pagini: 1000
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 mm
Editura: ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Seria Handbooks in Economics
Cuprins
Part 1: Matching without transfers
1. Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Theory
Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver
2. The large markets case
Yeon-Koo Che and Olivier Tercieux
3. Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Applications
Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver
4. Allocating students to schools: theory and empirical methods
Yeon-Koo Che, Julien Grenet and Yinghua He
Part 2: Matching with Transfers
5. Matching with Transfers: Theory
PIERRE A. CHIAPPORI and Corinne Low
6. Matching with Transfers: Applications
Bernard Salanie
7. Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility
Alfred Galichon
Part 3: Extensions
8. Pre-matching investments
Larry Samuelson and Georg Noldeke
9. Matching with contracts
Scott Duke Kominers and John Hatfield
10. Matching under asymmetric information
Qingmin Liu
11. Matching with frictions
Stephan Lauermann and Georg Noldeke
12. Dynamic Matching
Laura Doval
1. Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Theory
Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver
2. The large markets case
Yeon-Koo Che and Olivier Tercieux
3. Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Applications
Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver
4. Allocating students to schools: theory and empirical methods
Yeon-Koo Che, Julien Grenet and Yinghua He
Part 2: Matching with Transfers
5. Matching with Transfers: Theory
PIERRE A. CHIAPPORI and Corinne Low
6. Matching with Transfers: Applications
Bernard Salanie
7. Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility
Alfred Galichon
Part 3: Extensions
8. Pre-matching investments
Larry Samuelson and Georg Noldeke
9. Matching with contracts
Scott Duke Kominers and John Hatfield
10. Matching under asymmetric information
Qingmin Liu
11. Matching with frictions
Stephan Lauermann and Georg Noldeke
12. Dynamic Matching
Laura Doval