On November 24, 2013, Secretary Kerry announced that an interim negotiated settlement had been reached between the P5+1 and Iran on its nuclear program. The announcement contained the broad strokes, but was short on the details. The picture that was painted was that Iran would agree to modest limits on its enrichment capabilities, increased International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring, the cessation of manufacturing centrifuges, and it would not fuel the Arak heavy-water reactor. In exchange, Iran would receive an easing of sanctions on its oil sales and the suspension of certain sanctions on the import of precious metals and exports from Iran's auto and petrochemical sectors. The most glaring deficiency with this interim deal is its lopsidedness. Iran got a sweetheart deal, and the rest of the world is not any safer from the Iranian bomb than before. Iran maintains the ability, should it decide to break the agreement, to continue toward breakout capability with only a minor setback in any timetable.