This monograph determines the role and current posture of the United States Army, and specifically its intelligence corps, in Department of Defense (DoD) Intelligence Community (IC) implementation and execution of Intelligence Campaign Planning (ICP). ICP is emerging as a new procedure for the DoD IC to centrally plan ISR Synchronization in support of regional combatant commander operation plans. ICP initially emerged out of intelligence reform after September 11, 2001 and operational intelligence challenges evident during Operation Iraqi Freedom. As one of the sixteen agencies in the national IC and eight in the DoD IC, the Army has a role to play to ensure its intelligence requirements and capabilities are integrated into ICP. The authors method first proves Army intelligence, during its own transformation, missed a critical link to ICP, and follows with an assessment of progress already underway and how integration into the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) helps solidify ICP. The author concludes by analyzing how ready and relevant current Army intelligence is to institutionalize ICP across doctrine, organization, training and personnel areas of the DOTMLPF. The monograph includes content relevant to national and defense intelligence transformation to include Taking Stock of Defense Intelligence and Remodeling Defense Intelligence, proposed ICP concepts to include stand up and fielding of the Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) and Horizontal Integration (HI), the process and details of the Joint Concepts Development and Experimentation (JCD&E) for ICP, and what has been accomplished so far and how long it might take for full ICP implementation based on real world tests. With respect to the Army's ability to integrate into the ICP process, the author finds severe deficiencies in doctrine, training, and personnel utilization not easily offset by organizational successes achieved through the Army transformation to the modular force. Research for this monograph included classified documents to ensure accuracy of analysis, but in its entirety this monograph is unclassified. The author recommends updating and revising dilapidated Army intelligence doctrine regarding operational intelligence activities at echelons above corps, authorizing a dedicated plans shop to all Intelligence and Security Command headquarters to facilitate integration of Army intelligence requirements and capabilities into ICP, utilizing emerging and current joint training opportunities to minimize cost to establish ICP expertise resident in the Army, and revamping current Army policy for utilization of intelligence officers with recognized planning skills.