International Law for Freshwater Protection: International Water Law Series, cartea 9
Autor Agnes Chongen Limba Engleză Hardback – 31 mar 2022
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9789004511828
ISBN-10: 9004511822
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 mm
Greutate: 0 kg
Editura: Brill
Colecția Brill | Nijhoff
Seria International Water Law Series
ISBN-10: 9004511822
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 mm
Greutate: 0 kg
Editura: Brill
Colecția Brill | Nijhoff
Seria International Water Law Series
Notă biografică
Agnes Chong, Ph.D. (2018), University of Hong Kong, is Assistant Professor of Law at that university. Dr. Chong has published articles on water law and water rights, and with a focus on Asia.
Cuprins
Preface
Introduction
1Freshwater Protection Regime
1 Introduction
2 Development of Watercourses Law
2.1Navigational Uses
2.2Non-Navigational Uses
3 Theories of Utilisation
3.1Absolute Territorial Sovereignty
3.2Absolute Territorial Integrity
3.3Limited Territorial Sovereignty
3.4Community of Interest
4 International Treaty Regime
4.1UN Watercourses Convention
4.2Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers
4.3unece Water Convention
5 Customary International Law
6 International Environmental Legal Regime
7 Evolving Legal Regime
8 Norms of Conservation and Preservation
9 Sustainable Development
2Definitions of Freshwater Protection
1 Introduction
2 Sources of Freshwater Harm
3 What Is Harm?
3.1Dictionary Meanings
3.2Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
4 Definitions of International Watercourses
5 “Uses” versus “Effects”
6 Rejecting a Broad Definition and the Geographical Rationale
7 The Separation of “Uses” and “Effects” within the Regime
8 The Focus on “Uses” or “Utilisation” in the 1997 Watercourses Convention
9 Evolving International Law and the Parameters of States’ Obligations
3Rules and Principles of International Water Law
1 Introduction
2 Background to the 1997 Watercourses Convention
3 Regime Framework: The 1997 Watercourses Convention
3.1Principles of Equitable Utilisation, No-Harm and Cooperation
3.2Principles of Prior Notification and Prior Consultation
3.3Principles of Prevention, Protection and Conservation
3.4Precautionary Principle
3.5Contemporary Issues
4 The Hierarchy Question of Equitable Utilisation and No-Harm
4.1Inference of Hierarchy Was a Drafting Issue at the ilc
4.2No Hierarchy in Text of Article 7
4.3Consequences of an Inference of Hierarchy of Equitable Utilisation over No-Harm
4The Relationship between Equitable Utilisation and No-Harm
1 Introduction
2 Assumption of a Hierarchical Relationship
3 Conflation of the No-Harm Maxims in the Two Rules
4 No-Harm Maxim’s Dual Limitation on State Activity: Theoretical Principles of the 1997 Watercourses Convention
4.1Theories of International Water Law
4.2Limited Sovereignty and the Limiting Role on the Freedom on States
4.3Principle of Sovereign Equality and Equitable Utilisation (Underlying the Water Allocation Doctrine)
4.4Principle of Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas and No-Harm (Underlying the Water Quality Doctrine)
5 Resolutions of the Institute of International Law
5.11911 Madrid Declaration: Two Limiting Roles of Harm
5.21961 Salzburg Resolution: Does Not Prohibit Harm
5.31979 Athens Resolution: Prohibits Harm
5.4Contrasting Application of Equitable Utilisation in the 1979 Athens Resolution and in the 1982 Montreal Rules
6 Merger of No-Harm with Equitable Utilisation
7 Concerns that the Convention Is Biased towards Downstream States
8 Interpreting the Law to Make the Law a Level Playing Field
9 Indeterminate Nature of Articles 7 and 5
10 Lawful State Activity
11 Conclusion
5The International Jurisprudence on “Due Regard”
1 Introduction
2 Due Regard as a Limitation on the Freedom of States
2.1Definition of Due Regard and Its Evolution from Reasonable Regard
2.1.1 Definition of Due Regard
2.1.2 Evolution from Reasonable Regard to Due Regard
2.2Rising Demands on the Use of Waters and the Greater Role of “Due Regard”
3 The Nature of the “Due Regard” Obligation
3.1Chagos: Consultation Is a Necessary Application of Due Regard
3.2South China Sea Arbitration: Due Regard Obligation Requires Specific Course of Action of Compliance
3.3Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland) and (Germany v Iceland): Due Regard for the Rights of Other States and the Needs of Conservation
3.4Arctic Sunrise Arbitration: Due Regard for State Interests and Other Rights under unclos
3.5itlos Fisheries Advisory Opinion: Regime of Compliance Included the Due Regard Obligation
3.6The M/V “Virginia G” Case Panama/Guinea-Bissau: Reciprocal Rights to Explore Must Have Due Regard for the Conservation and Management of Natural Resources and Relevant Circumstances
3.7The Substance of the Principle of Due Regard: The Standard of Reasonableness
4 The Due Regard Analysis
4.1High Seas
4.1.1 unclos and the Due Regard Provisions
4.2Outer Space
4.2.1 The Outer Space Treaties and Due Regard Provisions
4.2.1.1The 1967 Outer Space Treaty
4.2.1.2The 1979 Moon Agreement
4.2.2 The Overriding Emphasis on International Peace and Security and the Common Heritage of Mankind
4.3International Civil Aviation
4.3.1 The Chicago Convention and the Due Regard Provisions
4.3.2 The Overriding Emphasis on Aviation Safety
4.3.3 Due Regard Obligations
4.3.4 Due Regard Operations
5 Balance of Rights and Duties in a Due-Regard Formula
5.1Environmental Due-Regard Formula
5.2The Factorial Approach: Implications of a Due-Regard Formula
6 Conclusion
6The Non-applicability of Hierarchical Norms under International Law
1 Introduction
2 Hierarchy in International Law
2.1International Constitutionalism, Jus Cogens and Norms Accepted by the “International Community of States as a Whole”
2.2Hierarchy of Norms
2.3Politics of Apportionment Affects Interpretation of the Law
2.3.1 State Sovereignty
2.3.2 A Hierarchy Needed to Adjust the “Inequitable Effects” of Article 7
3 No Hierarchy of Sources, but Hierarchy of Norms
3.1No Hierarchy of Sources of Law and the Nicaragua Case
3.2Hierarchy of Norms and the Nicaragua Case
4 Non-Applicability of Hierarchy of Norms to Equitable Utilisation and No-Harm Rules
4.1Conditions a Hierarchy May Be Applied: Jus Cogens, Crimes of State, Obligations Erga Omnes and Article 103 of the UN Charter
4.1.1 Jus Cogens
4.1.2 Crimes of the State
4.1.3 Obligations Erga Omnes
4.1.4 Article 103 of the UN Charter
5 No Justification for the Application of Hierarchy
5.1The Gabcikovo Case: No Hierarchy between Equitable Utilisation and No-Harm
5.1.1 Background to the Case
5.1.2 Act by Hungary
5.1.3 Act by Slovakia
5.1.4 Competing Equitable Utilisation Rights
5.1.5 Making Reparations: Court’s Ruling on Harm Caused
6 Commentators Claim “Harm is Permissible”
6.1“Mixing the Apples and Oranges”
6.2Harm Is Not Permissible
6.2.1 Harm in Relation to Equitable Utilisation
6.2.2 Harm in Relation to No-Harm
7 Conclusion
7The Due Diligence Obligation
1 Introduction
2 State Responsibility and Prevention of Harm
3 The Meaning of Due Diligence
4 Due Diligence Obligation
5 Significant Harm
6 The 2001 Prevention Articles as the Basis of Prevention of Risk of Harm
7 The Emergence of the Positive Obligation to Prevent Risk of Harm
8 Standard of Conduct
9 Positive Obligations in Water Law
10 Conclusion
8Case Study of the Mekong River Commission
1 International Water Law: The Cooperation Mechanism
2 Case Study of the 1995 Mekong Agreement and the Practice of the Mekong River Commission
2.1The Formation of the 1995 Mekong Agreement
2.2The Practice of the Mekong River Commission
3 Conclusion
9Conclusion
1 Introduction
2 Issues in the Freshwater Protection Regime
3 Reasons Underlying Preoccupation of the Regime with Allocation of Uses
3.1Interpreting “having due regard for” Leads to a Balance of Obligations, Not an Inference of a Hierarchy
3.2No Relevant Basis in International Law to Imply a Hierarchy
3.3Assumptions of a Hierarchy
4 Implications of Research
Index
Introduction
1Freshwater Protection Regime
1 Introduction
2 Development of Watercourses Law
2.1Navigational Uses
2.2Non-Navigational Uses
3 Theories of Utilisation
3.1Absolute Territorial Sovereignty
3.2Absolute Territorial Integrity
3.3Limited Territorial Sovereignty
3.4Community of Interest
4 International Treaty Regime
4.1UN Watercourses Convention
4.2Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers
4.3unece Water Convention
5 Customary International Law
6 International Environmental Legal Regime
7 Evolving Legal Regime
8 Norms of Conservation and Preservation
9 Sustainable Development
2Definitions of Freshwater Protection
1 Introduction
2 Sources of Freshwater Harm
3 What Is Harm?
3.1Dictionary Meanings
3.2Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
4 Definitions of International Watercourses
5 “Uses” versus “Effects”
6 Rejecting a Broad Definition and the Geographical Rationale
7 The Separation of “Uses” and “Effects” within the Regime
8 The Focus on “Uses” or “Utilisation” in the 1997 Watercourses Convention
9 Evolving International Law and the Parameters of States’ Obligations
3Rules and Principles of International Water Law
1 Introduction
2 Background to the 1997 Watercourses Convention
3 Regime Framework: The 1997 Watercourses Convention
3.1Principles of Equitable Utilisation, No-Harm and Cooperation
3.2Principles of Prior Notification and Prior Consultation
3.3Principles of Prevention, Protection and Conservation
3.4Precautionary Principle
3.5Contemporary Issues
4 The Hierarchy Question of Equitable Utilisation and No-Harm
4.1Inference of Hierarchy Was a Drafting Issue at the ilc
4.2No Hierarchy in Text of Article 7
4.3Consequences of an Inference of Hierarchy of Equitable Utilisation over No-Harm
4The Relationship between Equitable Utilisation and No-Harm
1 Introduction
2 Assumption of a Hierarchical Relationship
3 Conflation of the No-Harm Maxims in the Two Rules
4 No-Harm Maxim’s Dual Limitation on State Activity: Theoretical Principles of the 1997 Watercourses Convention
4.1Theories of International Water Law
4.2Limited Sovereignty and the Limiting Role on the Freedom on States
4.3Principle of Sovereign Equality and Equitable Utilisation (Underlying the Water Allocation Doctrine)
4.4Principle of Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas and No-Harm (Underlying the Water Quality Doctrine)
5 Resolutions of the Institute of International Law
5.11911 Madrid Declaration: Two Limiting Roles of Harm
5.21961 Salzburg Resolution: Does Not Prohibit Harm
5.31979 Athens Resolution: Prohibits Harm
5.4Contrasting Application of Equitable Utilisation in the 1979 Athens Resolution and in the 1982 Montreal Rules
6 Merger of No-Harm with Equitable Utilisation
7 Concerns that the Convention Is Biased towards Downstream States
8 Interpreting the Law to Make the Law a Level Playing Field
9 Indeterminate Nature of Articles 7 and 5
10 Lawful State Activity
11 Conclusion
5The International Jurisprudence on “Due Regard”
1 Introduction
2 Due Regard as a Limitation on the Freedom of States
2.1Definition of Due Regard and Its Evolution from Reasonable Regard
2.1.1 Definition of Due Regard
2.1.2 Evolution from Reasonable Regard to Due Regard
2.2Rising Demands on the Use of Waters and the Greater Role of “Due Regard”
3 The Nature of the “Due Regard” Obligation
3.1Chagos: Consultation Is a Necessary Application of Due Regard
3.2South China Sea Arbitration: Due Regard Obligation Requires Specific Course of Action of Compliance
3.3Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland) and (Germany v Iceland): Due Regard for the Rights of Other States and the Needs of Conservation
3.4Arctic Sunrise Arbitration: Due Regard for State Interests and Other Rights under unclos
3.5itlos Fisheries Advisory Opinion: Regime of Compliance Included the Due Regard Obligation
3.6The M/V “Virginia G” Case Panama/Guinea-Bissau: Reciprocal Rights to Explore Must Have Due Regard for the Conservation and Management of Natural Resources and Relevant Circumstances
3.7The Substance of the Principle of Due Regard: The Standard of Reasonableness
4 The Due Regard Analysis
4.1High Seas
4.1.1 unclos and the Due Regard Provisions
4.2Outer Space
4.2.1 The Outer Space Treaties and Due Regard Provisions
4.2.1.1The 1967 Outer Space Treaty
4.2.1.2The 1979 Moon Agreement
4.2.2 The Overriding Emphasis on International Peace and Security and the Common Heritage of Mankind
4.3International Civil Aviation
4.3.1 The Chicago Convention and the Due Regard Provisions
4.3.2 The Overriding Emphasis on Aviation Safety
4.3.3 Due Regard Obligations
4.3.4 Due Regard Operations
5 Balance of Rights and Duties in a Due-Regard Formula
5.1Environmental Due-Regard Formula
5.2The Factorial Approach: Implications of a Due-Regard Formula
6 Conclusion
6The Non-applicability of Hierarchical Norms under International Law
1 Introduction
2 Hierarchy in International Law
2.1International Constitutionalism, Jus Cogens and Norms Accepted by the “International Community of States as a Whole”
2.2Hierarchy of Norms
2.3Politics of Apportionment Affects Interpretation of the Law
2.3.1 State Sovereignty
2.3.2 A Hierarchy Needed to Adjust the “Inequitable Effects” of Article 7
3 No Hierarchy of Sources, but Hierarchy of Norms
3.1No Hierarchy of Sources of Law and the Nicaragua Case
3.2Hierarchy of Norms and the Nicaragua Case
4 Non-Applicability of Hierarchy of Norms to Equitable Utilisation and No-Harm Rules
4.1Conditions a Hierarchy May Be Applied: Jus Cogens, Crimes of State, Obligations Erga Omnes and Article 103 of the UN Charter
4.1.1 Jus Cogens
4.1.2 Crimes of the State
4.1.3 Obligations Erga Omnes
4.1.4 Article 103 of the UN Charter
5 No Justification for the Application of Hierarchy
5.1The Gabcikovo Case: No Hierarchy between Equitable Utilisation and No-Harm
5.1.1 Background to the Case
5.1.2 Act by Hungary
5.1.3 Act by Slovakia
5.1.4 Competing Equitable Utilisation Rights
5.1.5 Making Reparations: Court’s Ruling on Harm Caused
6 Commentators Claim “Harm is Permissible”
6.1“Mixing the Apples and Oranges”
6.2Harm Is Not Permissible
6.2.1 Harm in Relation to Equitable Utilisation
6.2.2 Harm in Relation to No-Harm
7 Conclusion
7The Due Diligence Obligation
1 Introduction
2 State Responsibility and Prevention of Harm
3 The Meaning of Due Diligence
4 Due Diligence Obligation
5 Significant Harm
6 The 2001 Prevention Articles as the Basis of Prevention of Risk of Harm
7 The Emergence of the Positive Obligation to Prevent Risk of Harm
8 Standard of Conduct
9 Positive Obligations in Water Law
10 Conclusion
8Case Study of the Mekong River Commission
1 International Water Law: The Cooperation Mechanism
2 Case Study of the 1995 Mekong Agreement and the Practice of the Mekong River Commission
2.1The Formation of the 1995 Mekong Agreement
2.2The Practice of the Mekong River Commission
3 Conclusion
9Conclusion
1 Introduction
2 Issues in the Freshwater Protection Regime
3 Reasons Underlying Preoccupation of the Regime with Allocation of Uses
3.1Interpreting “having due regard for” Leads to a Balance of Obligations, Not an Inference of a Hierarchy
3.2No Relevant Basis in International Law to Imply a Hierarchy
3.3Assumptions of a Hierarchy
4 Implications of Research
Index