The role of monitoring Iran's nuclear program and verifying its adherence to the agreement falls on the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, and our Intelligence Community. Neither option inspires much confidence considering we failed to detect Iran's covert activity before and we failed to detect nuclear activity in Syria and North Korea in the past. History has shown us that our intelligence assessments are not always perfect. Just last year, the Defense Department put out its own assessment that we do, in fact, lack the capability to detect covert nuclear sites in Iran and wouldn't be able to detect a move toward breakout. As a signatory to the NPT and the Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA since 1974, Iran was required to make accurate and complete declarations of all of its nuclear material and nuclear-related activities to the IAEA. Since 2003, Iran has done everything it can to deceive, block, and prevent the IAEA from gaining the access it needs to verify its nuclear program.