With the advent of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, a debate has arisen concerning the manual's origins and its applicability to today's insurgencies. Critics, such as Colonel Gian Gentile, claim that the manual is overly influenced by French theories focused on stopping a Maoist type insurgency and this influence precludes its utility for other types of counterinsurgency campaigns. Those who support the manual, such as Colonel (retired) Peter Mansoor, point to the timing of its December 2006 publication in relation to the surge of forces into Iraq in January 2007 and the corresponding change in fortunes for the United States (US) led coalition as proof of its success. Does French Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, as developed and practiced in Algeria and Vietnam, have utility for the current American counterinsurgent? Using experiences gained in command during two tours of duty in Iraq, this thesis attempts to show that the following French theorists had utility for those commands: Bernard Fall, David Galula, and Roger Trinquier.