Israeli Prisoner of War Policies: From the 1949 Armistice to the 2006 Kidnappings examines the development of Israel's policies toward prisoners of war across multiple conflicts. Taking POWs is an indication of strength and a method of deterrence. However, the conditions leading to the release of POWs are often the result of the asymmetry in diplomatic power between two parties, or, as in the case of Israel, the gap between military might and diplomatic weakness within a single country. Consequently, the issue of POWs and their military and diplomatic significance represents at least two levels of actors' behavior: what the criteria should be for taking POWs and what mechanism should be employed and what price should be paid in order to secure their release. Studying the prisoner exchange deals involving Israel reveals three eras in the emergence of Israeli POW policy. Israel has had no comprehensive policy or guiding set of directives. The lack of a well-established policy was not only the result of the unstable nature of Israeli politics, but was to a large extent the result of the tendency of most Israeli cabinets to delay critical decisions. Successive Israeli governments have witnessed three distinct periods of conflict requiring unique approaches to POWs: a confrontation with nation states, 1948/49 to the June 1967 War; a mixed challenge posed by national and sub-national players, 1967 to the aftermath of the October 1973 War; and the long battle with sub-national actors, first Palestinians and later Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims. This volume seeks to apply the lessons of Israel's complex POW policies to conflicts around the world.