THIS PAPER WILL FIRST EXPLORE US OPERATIONS AGAINST PLOESTI FROM 1942 UNTIL THE CITY'S CAPTURE BY THE SOVIETS IN 1944. THE FIRST CHAPTER RECOUNTS INITIAL US ATTACKS AGAINST THE REFINERIES. THE SHOESTRING HALVERSON PROJECT MADE THE FIRST ATTEMPT AGAINST THE ROMANIAN REFINERIES IN 1942. OPERATIONS DID NOT START IN EARNEST, HOWEVER, UNTIL THE COSTLY TIDAL WAVE LOW-LEVEL ATTACK OF 1 AUGUST 1943. THIS OPERATION OBTAINED SOME OPERATIONAL EFFECT, BUT THE LOSSES VIRTUALLY DESTROYED IX BOMBER COMMAND. CHAPTER 2 PICKS UP THE STORY EIGHT MONTHS LATER AS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE RETURNED TO MORE TRADITIONAL HIGHALTITUDE TACTICS WHEN IT CAMPAIGNED AGAINST PLOESTI. FROM APRIL TO AUGUST 1944, ALLIED FORCES SLOWLY REFINED THEIR MEDIUM ALTITUDE TACTICS, INFLICTING CUMULATIVE DAMAGE AGAINST THE OIL FACILITIES. THESE RESULTS CAME AT A HEAVY PRICE, THOUGH, WITH THE ARMY AIR FORCE EVENTUALLY LOSING 286 BOMBERS IN ATTACKS AGAINST THE REFINERIES. THE NEXT TWO CHAPTERS OUTLINE THE AMERICAN EFFORT AGAINST BALIKPAPAN. CHAPTER 4 DESCRIBES THE INITIAL PLANNING AGAINST BALIKPAPAN AS WELL THE NIGHT ATTACK FLOWN FROM AUSTRALIA IN 1943. THE FOCUS OF THE CHAPTER, HOWEVER, IS ON THE ATTACKS OF 30 SEPTEMBER AND 3 OCTOBER 1944, WHEN JAPANESE DEFENSES MAULED UNESCORTED FEAF AIRCRAFT BOMBING FROM MEDIUM ALTITUDE. CHAPTER 5 RECOUNTS HOW FEAF REACTED TO THESE EVENTS. IN ONLY A WEEK, FEAF STRATEGISTS DIGESTED THE FIRST TWO RAIDS' PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPED RADICAL NEW SOLUTIONS TO DEAL WITH JAPANESE DEFENSES. BETWEEN 10 AND 18 OCTOBER, THREE ATTACKS SHOWCASED THESE NEW TACTICS, RESULTING IN WHOLESALE DAMAGE TO THE FACILITIES. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS DESTRUCTION DID NOT HAVE THE DRAMATIC EFFECT ON THE JAPANESE WAR EFFORT PREDICTED BY FEAF LEADERS. THE LAST CHAPTER DRAWS LESSONS APPLICABLE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. INITIALLY, THE CHAPTER REVIEWS THE OPERATIONS, PLACING PERTINENT ASPECTS SIDE-BY-SIDE TO ILLUMINATE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES. THEN, THE CHAPTER DRAWS FROM THESE TO ANALYZE LEADERSHIP, THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE, AND THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. FINALLY, THE CHAPTER EXAMINES TWO ISSUES THAT BOTH FEAF AND USSTAF STRUGGLED WITH THROUGHOUT THEIR OPERATIONS: DOCTRINAL BIAS AND COMBAT ASSESSMENT. THESE LESSONS POINT TO ATTRIBUTES THAT ANY COMBAT ORGANIZATION CAN NURTURE TO IMPROVE ITS CHANCES FOR SUCCESS.