The purpose of this collection of eleven essays on the philosophy of Edmund Husserl is not to offer a comprehensive overview of Husserl's philosophy. Of his many themes, only a selection is covered in this volume. But the collection is of interest for anyone in touch with the current philosophy of mind - which has undergone a remarkable broadening of its perspective: now, not only the causal and functional, but also the, broadly speaking, phenomenological and intentional aspects of the mind are being given what is due to them. Accompanying this broadening, there is a rediscovery - which for many philosophers from the analytic tradition means: a first discovery - of Husserlian phenomenology. The centre of this collection is formed by the five essays on Husserl's views on perceptual experience and perceptual justification. These central essays are preceded by an essay on apprehension and an essay on motivation (both important Husserlian notions), and are followed by an essay on empathy and an essay on emotions (two Husserlian topics that are all too often neglected). The first essay of the collection presents, in a comprehensive and detailed way, complementarism as an alternative to Husserl's classical phenomenological approach, transcendental reduction. The last essay concerns the issue of collective unity in Kant and Husserl, an ontological issue that is crucial for all transcendental philosophy. All of the eleven essays are new and have undergone a peer-review process. The authors: Audrey L. Anton, Carleton B. Christensen, Jasper Doomen, John J. Drummond, Richard Foley, Stamatios Gerogiorgakis, Michael Groneberg, George Heffernan, Hans-Ulrich Hoche, Burt C. Hopkins, Ansten Klev, Helga Meier, Manuel Lechthaler, Sophie Loidolt, Filip Mattens, Verena Mayer, Sean McAleer, Tommaso Piazza, Alexander Reutlinger, Adriane A. Rini, Sara L. Uckelman, Philip J. Walsh, Christian Wirrwitz, Kristina Zuelicke