Cantitate/Preț
Produs

Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity: Great Debates in Philosophy

Autor G. Harman
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 24 noi 1995
Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework.

Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost.

Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics.

Citește tot Restrânge

Din seria Great Debates in Philosophy

Preț: 21656 lei

Preț vechi: 29948 lei
-28% Nou

Puncte Express: 325

Preț estimativ în valută:
4144 4300$ 3464£

Carte indisponibilă temporar

Doresc să fiu notificat când acest titlu va fi disponibil:

Preluare comenzi: 021 569.72.76

Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780631192114
ISBN-10: 0631192115
Pagini: 240
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 13 mm
Greutate: 0.37 kg
Editura: Wiley
Seria Great Debates in Philosophy

Locul publicării:Chichester, United Kingdom

Public țintă

upper–level undergraduates and above in ethics, moral philosophy and meta–ethics

Notă biografică

Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Princeton. His publications include Thought (1973), The Nature of Morality (1977), and Change in View (1986).

Judith Jarvis Thomson is Professor of Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her publications include The Realm of Rights (1990), and Rights, Restitution and Risk (1986).


Descriere

Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework.