Despite the ongoing preventive actions, supervision failure remains the most serious contributor to aircraft accidents in the Brazilian Air Force (FAB). The Organizational Accidents Theory, introduced by James Reason (1997), focuses on the preexisting conditions that result from fallible decisions made by top management. Squadron Commanders are the managers who deal directly with frontline operations in the FAB, becoming the last managerial barriers to counteract flaw top-down decision-makings. The purpose of this study aims to assess squadron commanders' perceptions regarding the theory of Organizational Accidents to improve FAB's safety performance. Three research hypotheses have been formulated and answered. Surveys were sent to squadron commanders and 20 responded to them. Despite the basic understanding of aviation safety, the results show that squadron commanders need more education in advanced safety models as well as the theory of Organizational Accidents. Squadron Commanders also need a better decision-making process tailored for their managerial decisions.