Thisbook examines the legislative, representative, and control functions ofnational parliaments and parliamentary parties during the reform of Europeaneconomic governance. The empirical analysis focuses on domestic approvals ofanti-crisis measures (EFSF, ESM and the Fiscal Compact) in all member states ofthe Eurozone, and the extent to which parliaments and parties secured theircompetences in EU policy-making during that process. In order to address thisquestion, Maatsch employs an interdisciplinary approach and analyses (i) inwhich state parliaments’ formal powers in approval of anti-crisis measureswere constrained, (ii) how parliamentary parties voted on the analysedmeasures, (iii) the dominant discourses of their proponents and opponents and(iv) which parties advocated neoliberal and which Keynesian measures. This bookwill appeal to advanced students and scholars of European integration, Europeanisation,and European governance, as well as policy advisers or researchers, working onthe EMU, or the financial crises in particular.