This work is the outcome of the critical examination of Karl Popper¿s philosophy of science from the physicist's point of view. In carrying this examination out, the author deemed it necessary to analyze his philosophy in connection with what it says, or can say, about epistemological and cognitive questions of physics and in doing so to examine this philosophy of science in itself. The validity of critical discourse analysis was necessary and, in order to show that Popper¿s theory of science stripped of its high-sounding words, terms and deeds is a failure, it was crucial to proceed with quoting him frequently. This works aims not at developing another ¿philosophy¿ of science as an alternative to Karl Popper's, or any such a speculative theory (or ¿meta-theory¿). The author believes that the exposition in the following work possesses internal coherence underlying the criticism and views that he has advanced. Due to the importance of various epistemological aspects of empirical sciences and of physics upon which the author has touched in this work, it seemed obvious to him to advance some views on questions which are of certain interest for the philosophy of science, in general.