This monograph addresses doctrinal considerations for power projection in a predominately CONUS bases military. It will examine the concept of deployment from the perspective of the operational level of war. There appears to be a void in deployment doctrine as assumptions for deployment of U.S. forces focus on either end of the scale of potential conditions for extra-theater movement (forced entry or strategic buildup). Contemporary deployment doctrine may not address an operational deployment in a relatively immature theater. 1965 was a seminal year for power projection for the United States. Not since the Korean War 15 years earlier, and Desert Shield 15 years later, would this nation deploy large formations of its armed forces from CONUS in circumstances that potentially would require immediate synchronized and sequential combat actions. In Korea and in 1965, the deployment of the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to Vietnam, forces were deployed and immediately employed in campaigns designed to achieve operational objectives critical to the strategic end state. This monograph will analyze the operational design and considerations for the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division from Fort Benning, GA to Central Highlands of the Republic of Vietnam. It will use the criteria of the TRADOC Pam 11-9 Operational Operating Systems, the establishment of the lodgement, and the integration of joint and combined forces during this deployment and apply those observations in analysis of current and evolving deployment doctrine. This monograph concludes that current and evolving deployment doctrine is beginning to embrace the experiences of the deployment to the Vietnamese Central Highlands particularly in terms of the concept of tailoring the deployment force at the Corps level. However, the doctrine focuses too much on the mechanics of moving the force and too little on the demanding planning aspects of deploying operational forces. Given a continued shortage of assets in the strategic mobility triad of sealift, airlift and prepositioning, doctrine falls short in establishing a critical imperative. This is that operational planners must consider the sequence and detailed composition of the deploying force, the role of the lodgement, and potential contributions of other services or allies in the context of the operational design. The success of a future power projection will probably not hinge significantly on hostile entry or will be given six months to build forces in theater. Deployment and employment may be seamless. Therefore, success will depend on the ability of planners to make operational deployment a fundamental building block of the campaign.