There are fears that the current preoccupation with counterinsurgency operations (COIN) is dominating leader development and is contributing to a decline in America's unrivaled competency at the higher end of the spectrum of conflict. The United States began this century with the world's preeminent conventional military force and validated this title with overwhelming conventional victories against the Taliban and the Iraqi Military. However, soon after these euphoric battlefield victories we found ourselves unprepared for stability operations in Iraq and its emerging insurgency. The Army rapidly energized its efforts to rectify our COIN deficiencies by publishing FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations in 2006. The publication of current doctrine, tailored predeployment training, and the incorporation of COIN into our professional military education programs, has been instrumental in building the Army's competence in combating insurgencies. American soldiers are now battle hardened but may be losing their edge in fighting major conventional combat operations. This study argues that the Army must decide how to prepare its leaders for future threats with the competency to effectively conduct full spectrum operations.