The momentous events in Egypt since January 25, 2011, have focused the world's attention on that critical country. Mostly young, pro-democracy activists appear to have successfully challenged Egypt's authoritarian government and its long-time leader. President Hosni Mubarak has been driven from office and is reportedly in poor health. Hence, regime change is virtually certain. The Egyptian military, long a major power broker, gained popular support for its restrained reaction to the uprisings of January-February 2011 and currently (July 2011) the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, headed by Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi, leads the nation pending promised elections in the autumn. However, recent events suggest that the military may be reluctant to relinquish power fully, and popular unrest against it is rising. Thus, most scenarios discussed in this paper, or variations thereof, are still very possible. Prior to the events of January 25, 2011, most of the attention on Egypt was focused on the presidential succession issue, given that President Mubarak had achieved an advanced age, had several medical operations that put his health in doubt, and had steadfastly refused to appoint a vice president. There was also widespread speculation that he was grooming his son, Gamal Mubarak, to succeed him despite rumors that the Egyptian military establishment had strong doubts about Gamal's qualifications, in part because he had not done military service. Although the developments of January and February 2011 seemed to have overtaken events as they were known in 2010, the issue of presidential succession remains both highly relevant and timely. Whatever type of successor government comes to power in Egypt, it is likely that, given Egyptian history, the post-Mubarak president will have strong powers (though probably not to the extent of President Mubarak), to include remaining the head of the Egyptian military establishment.