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Realism Rescued

Autor Jerrold L. Aronson, Rom Harre, Eileen Cornell Way
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 28 feb 1995
This text presents a defence of scientific realism against sceptical and positivist attacks. It relies on the importance of models in scientific work. Using the "type hierarchy", a technique of knowledge representation drawn from artificial intelligence, it provides an account of these models.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780812692884
ISBN-10: 0812692888
Pagini: 213
Dimensiuni: 161 x 237 x 21 mm
Greutate: 0.55 kg
Editura: OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO ,U.S.

Textul de pe ultima copertă

Does science give us a progressively more accurate and objective account of the world? This book by three leading philosophers of science presents a new defense of scientific realism against skeptical and positivist attacks. While positivists view scientific theories as devices for predicting observable phenomena, realists maintain that theories describe hidden processes which account for observable phenomena. This problem raises the question: What are scientific theories about? Do they refer to an unobservable yet real realm of physical processes? It seems undeniable that the scientific endeavor has in some sense made progress. But is the increasing practical success of the physical sciences good grounds for believing that their theories and techniques lead us nearer to the truth? According to Aronson, Harre, and Way, past failures to answer these questions have been due in large part to the assumption that knowledge is expressed in propositions and organized by the canons of logic. On the assumption that science must meet the world in a correspondence between statements and states of affairs, realism turns out to be difficult to defend. Realism Rescued offers a new direction, relying on the importance of models in scientific work. Theories are not to be thought of as sets of propositions, though they can be expressed propositionally. Rather they are models, chunks of orderings of natural kinds. For the first time, the indispensability of models is turned into a powerful argument for realism, an argument that confronts the skeptic on his own ground. By drawing on a new technique of knowledge representation developed in Artificial Intelligence, the dynamic type-hierarchy, the authorsgive a convincing account of the central role of models. Such concepts as verisimilitude, natural kind, natural necessity, and natural law can then be presented far more clearly than ever before.