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Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: MIT Press

Autor Robert J. Aumann, Michael Maschler
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 16 mar 2014
During the height of the Cold War, between 1965 and 1968, Robert Aumann, Michael Maschler, and Richard Stearns collaborated on researchon the dynamics of arms control negotiations that has since become foundational to work on repeated games. These five seminal papers are collected here for the first time, with the addition of "postscripts" describing many of the developments since the papers were written.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780262526265
ISBN-10: 0262526263
Pagini: 360
Dimensiuni: 154 x 230 x 20 mm
Greutate: 0.51 kg
Editura: Mit Press
Seria MIT Press


Notă biografică

Michael Maschler was a game theorist and Professor of Mathematics at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.