The key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair.

Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as there 'Chilcot Report') tackled:

- Saddam Hussein's threat to Britain

- the legal advice for the invasion

- intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and

- planning for a post-conflict Iraq.

This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016.

Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books

'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.'

Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of 10 million.

The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document.

Contents

Introduction

Pre-conflict strategy and planning

The UK decision to support US military action

Why Iraq? Why now?

The UK's relationship with the US

Decision-making

Advice on the legal basis for military action

Weapons of mass destruction

Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq

The post-conflict period

Occupation

Transition

Planning for withdrawal

Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?

Key findings

Lessons

Timeline of events



REVIEWS

The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons.

It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.

-- Philippe Sands, London Review of Books



A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft.

Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times.

-- Derek B. Miller, The Guardian



Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies.

Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort...

-- Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books

Ideal for any student of politics, diplomacy, or conflict.