In this book he has had the benefit of access to secret Special Branch records and it will certainly take its place as the first, and at present the only, account of the revived Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) attempt to subvert, undermine and terrify a firmly established Malaysia. The role of the Special Branch in defeating every Communist move in this twenty year campaign was of paramount importance and Dr Leong himself played a leading part in all the operations that gradually strangled every twist and turn of Communist planning and active operations. He begins by contrasting the preparations for a renewed struggle made by the enemy and the Malayan Government. The Communist leadership, virtually secure in the South Thailand bases to which the remnants of their armed forces had retreated after their final defeat, in and at the end of the 1948-1960 'Emergency', must be awarded full marks for determination as they prepared for the next campaign. Veterans were demobilized, new recruits drawn from the local Chinese population were trained as the base and the influence of the extended and two attempted break away movements were bloodily suppressed. Over two thousand young Chinese from Malaya were also put through political and military training and returned to Malaya to act as an underground support organisation for future operations. Later following a number of unsuccessful attempts to establish bases in Malaya, special highly trained 'Mobile Units' were given the task of killing members of the Special Branch which the Communist leadership regarded as the most dangerous and effective component of the Malaysian Forces. Operation Bamboo aimed at securing, as far as possible, that part of Perak and Kelantan adjacent to and south of the Thai border. A combination of resettlement and winning the 'hearts and minds' of the Orang Asli and establishing a good intelligence network amongst them was the principle move in this precautionary operation. Road communications were improved and food control in logging areas was imposed. The author reviews all other preparatory moves prior to enemy action and the general strategy when action began in great detail with particular reference to the reorganization and improvements in Special Branch organisation and methods both in co-operation with the Thai authorities in Thailand and within Malaya. The contrast between the complete surprise and lack of preparation in 1948 and the professionalism of government and security forces preparations prior to the opening of the Communist offensive in 1970 is most impressive.