The Confederate Cavalry that remained with the main body of the Army of Northern Virginia during the initial days of the Gettysburg Campaign failed to assume Stuart's eastern flank reconnaissance and security mission when he was unable to perform it. Evidence shows that there is shared responsibility for this failure among commanders at the brigade, division, corps, and army levels. Much of the blame of their failure to perform reconnaissance and security is placed on the Confederate Cavalry Commander, J. E. B. Stuart. What is often overlooked are the actions of the cavalry formations that remained with General R. E. Lee. This force of four brigades had the opportunity to fill the gap left by Stuart and could have provided Lee with the reconnaissance, security, and intelligence he needed. This paper examines the performance of those cavalry formations and studies why they did not, or could not, assume Stuart's mission on the eastern flank. Conclusions are that the following contributed to this failure: 1) Leadership and Initiative, 2) Capabilities of the Cavalry, 3) Command and Control and Staff Organizations, 4) Attitude of the Army of Northern Virginia and the Cavalry.