This monograph discusses the increased logistical dependency of the modern battlefield at the operational level of war. Given this dependency, the monograph examines whether a counterlogistics fight at the operational level of war has become the decisive operational fight. The monograph demonstrates the potential effects of designing a campaign plan around this fight. The terms used throughout the monograph are first defined. Next, a theoretical base for the proposed counterlogistics concept is established by relying on such theorists as Clausewitz, Jomini, Douhet, and others. Examples from history - Vicksburg and Operation Desert Storm - are analyzed to add validity to future proposals and identify lessons learned from the past. A model is developed to visualize the potential of the counterlogistcs concept. Then current doctrine is analyzed to determine if the concept of a decisive counterlogistics fight is adequately addressed. Finally, implications of current doctrine and capabilities of current systems are discussed along with potential limitations for the planning and executing of an operational counterlogistics fight. Included is the necessity to totally isolate the modern battlefield and maintain the resolve and patience required to execute a counterlogistics fight. The requirements for the operational planner to protect friendly logistics systems are likewise discussed.