Strategies and Games, second edition
Autor Prajit K. Dutta, Wouter Vergoteen Limba Engleză Hardback – 9 aug 2022
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780262046527
ISBN-10: 0262046520
Pagini: 648
Ilustrații: 110 figures
Dimensiuni: 210 x 235 x 40 mm
Greutate: 1.39 kg
Editura: MIT Press Ltd
ISBN-10: 0262046520
Pagini: 648
Ilustrații: 110 figures
Dimensiuni: 210 x 235 x 40 mm
Greutate: 1.39 kg
Editura: MIT Press Ltd
Notă biografică
Prajit K. Dutta and Wouter Vergote
Cuprins
Preface xxiii
Part One Introductions 1
Chapter 1 A First Look at the Applications 3
Chapter 2 A First Look at the Theory 21
Part Two Strategic Form Games: Theory and Practice 39
Chapter 3 Strategic Form Games and Dominant Strategies 41
Chapter 4 Dominance Solvability 57
Chapter 5 Nash Equilibrium 75
Chapter 6 An Application: Cournot Duopoly 89
Chapter 7 Voting and Elections 107
Chapter 8 An Application: The Commons Problem 125
Chapter 9 Mixed Strategies 139
Chapter 10 Two Applications: Natural Monopoly and Bankruptcy Law 161
Chapter 11 Zero-Sum Games 179
Part Three Extensive Form Games: Theory and Applications 199
Chapter 12 Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction 201
Chapter 13 An Application: Research and Development 225
Chapter 14 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 239
Chapter 15 Fintely Repeated Games 257
Chapter 16 Infinitely Repeated Games 277
Chapter 17 An Application: Competition and Collusion in the NASDAQ Stock Market 295
Chapter 18 An Application OPEC 309
Chapter 19 An Application: Logrolling and Pork-Barrel Spending 329
Chapter 20 An Application: Trade Agreements 345
Chapter 21 Dynamic Games with an Application to Global Warming 363
Chapter 22 Strategic Bargaining 385
Part Four Asymmetric Information Games: Theory and Applications 403
Chapter 23 Moral Hazard and Incentives Theory 405
Chapter 24 Games with Incomplete Information 423
Chapter 25 Mechanism Design, The Revelation Principle, and Sales to an Unknown Buyer 447
Chapter 26 An Application: Auctions 465
Chapter 27 An Application: Price Competition with Cost Uncertainty 481
Chapter 28 Signaling Games and the Lemons Problem 501
Chapter 29 An Application: Crisis Bargaining and Escalation 521
Part Five Cooperative Games and Matching 541
Chapter 30 Cooperative Games 543
Chapter 31 Matching Problems 567
Part Six Foundations 593
Chapter 32 Calculus and Optimization 595
Chapter 33 Probability and Expectation 613
Chapter 34 Utility and Expected Utility 625
Chapter 35 Existence of Nash Equilbria 641
Index 655
Part One Introductions 1
Chapter 1 A First Look at the Applications 3
Chapter 2 A First Look at the Theory 21
Part Two Strategic Form Games: Theory and Practice 39
Chapter 3 Strategic Form Games and Dominant Strategies 41
Chapter 4 Dominance Solvability 57
Chapter 5 Nash Equilibrium 75
Chapter 6 An Application: Cournot Duopoly 89
Chapter 7 Voting and Elections 107
Chapter 8 An Application: The Commons Problem 125
Chapter 9 Mixed Strategies 139
Chapter 10 Two Applications: Natural Monopoly and Bankruptcy Law 161
Chapter 11 Zero-Sum Games 179
Part Three Extensive Form Games: Theory and Applications 199
Chapter 12 Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction 201
Chapter 13 An Application: Research and Development 225
Chapter 14 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 239
Chapter 15 Fintely Repeated Games 257
Chapter 16 Infinitely Repeated Games 277
Chapter 17 An Application: Competition and Collusion in the NASDAQ Stock Market 295
Chapter 18 An Application OPEC 309
Chapter 19 An Application: Logrolling and Pork-Barrel Spending 329
Chapter 20 An Application: Trade Agreements 345
Chapter 21 Dynamic Games with an Application to Global Warming 363
Chapter 22 Strategic Bargaining 385
Part Four Asymmetric Information Games: Theory and Applications 403
Chapter 23 Moral Hazard and Incentives Theory 405
Chapter 24 Games with Incomplete Information 423
Chapter 25 Mechanism Design, The Revelation Principle, and Sales to an Unknown Buyer 447
Chapter 26 An Application: Auctions 465
Chapter 27 An Application: Price Competition with Cost Uncertainty 481
Chapter 28 Signaling Games and the Lemons Problem 501
Chapter 29 An Application: Crisis Bargaining and Escalation 521
Part Five Cooperative Games and Matching 541
Chapter 30 Cooperative Games 543
Chapter 31 Matching Problems 567
Part Six Foundations 593
Chapter 32 Calculus and Optimization 595
Chapter 33 Probability and Expectation 613
Chapter 34 Utility and Expected Utility 625
Chapter 35 Existence of Nash Equilbria 641
Index 655