Every French President since De Gaulle has made a major public speech on nuclear deterrence policy but no British Prime Minister ever has. This book considers why not?


The book offers an insider's analysis of the key factors that have influenced development of the uniquely British nuclear deterrence policy. It identifies an enduring aversion to the ethical implications of 'total' war and civilian casualties that evolved during the 20th Century. The book explores this aversion and links its implications for government thinking from the earliest air raids of the first World war, through the strategic bombing raids of the second World war and the development of the nuclear deterrent to the end of the cold war and the announcement of the Dreadnought programme. It develops the idea that in a supreme emergency, a breach of otherwise inviolable moral rules might be excused, but never justified, in order to prevent a greater moral catastrophe.


Exploiting the author's profound personal engagement with this most challenging moral issue, the book synthesises the ethics of nuclear deterrence with a uniquely holistic view of policy taking account of the technical limitations of nuclear systems, the international security situation, domestic politics and government relations with the electorate. It concludes that successive British governments have been uniquely coy about discussing nuclear deterrence policy publicly because they feared to expose the complexity of the moral reasoning behind the policy.